Feb 27, 2013 6:00am EST
numbers. do you have a correct report? is this leading to a reductiothg in handling the taliban. [no audio >> this was a regrettable error. we are making adjustments. in spite of the adjustments, our assessment of the progress and is continuing.anistan we have pushed the taliban out of the population centers and they have failed to retake the areas they lost. this is true. our and the lead and have provided security for 87% of the country's population. there is a tendency to fixate on one metrics. the complete picture of progress in afghanistan is more nuanced. i would encourage you to look at the overall picture. we are looking to fix this error. we will report further information as we have it from kabul. >> does the report need to be fixed? >> we will take a look at adjustments that need to be made. >> does it call into question the statistics? forces are in the lead increasingly. they are entering the numbers. many people have acknowledged the problem. do you have to do it closer review of the statistics that have been cited repeatedly? >> i do not know that we have to undertake
Feb 15, 2013 6:00am EST
against any future taliban mischief. you can reasonably expect that an enemy that has been that determined, that agile, will very soon try to test the afghan security forces. that size of a force provides additional capability to allow the political process is too mature a bit. because of that, it seems a larger force would be a benefit. >> thank you. just one question for you, general rodriguez. this has to do with an extremist force that is desirable and other contingency-response forces that would be useful to put the africomm commander in a position to respond to benghazi. if you have not been asked that question, can you tell us whether you would look for ways to find the greater capability to provide contingency response forces beyond what they currently are and were in the case of the benghazi matter? >> yes, sir, i would. i will report back to the committee on that. they have made significant improvements and we have to continue to do that. >> thank you both. we look forward to your confirmation. i want to thank the senator for taking over this morning. it is appreciated
Feb 15, 2013 1:00am EST
effective in powering afghan communities to defend against taliban intimidation and violence. plans are being developed to increase the authorized size of the alp program from 30,000 to 45,000. the next centcom commander will also play an important role in shaping our enduring partnership with afghanistan after 2014. the partnership that i fully support. ike m. concerned however by the plants to reduce the afghan national security forces by a third starting in 2015. 352,000 to 230,000 by 2017. i believe that any future reductions in the size of the afghan forces should be based on security conditions in afghanistan at that time and this afghan security forces make and providing for their country security, we should reassure them that we will continue to support these efforts by deciding that as we withdraw our forces that there won't get drawdown and afghan forces. progress in afghanistan remains fragile and significant challenges to afghanistan's long-term stability remain. among the greatest threat to its stability are the safe havens for afghan insurgents across the pakistan border.
Feb 7, 2013 8:00pm EST
different approach described by the 9/11 commission as an all out secret effort to persuade the taliban to expel bin laden. as we know, bin laden was not expelled. three months later, his wrath was unleashed with an attack on our embassies. did you advise director tenant against this operation? and if so, why? >> i had a conversation with george and that at the time. every single cia manager, george tennant as deputy director of operations at the time, and other individuals at the counter-terrorism center argued against that operation as well because it was not well grounded in intelligence, and its chances of success were minimal. and it was likely that other individuals would be killed. when i was involved in those discussions, i provided the director and others my professional advice about whether i thought that operation should go forward. i also was engaged in discussion with the saudi government at the time. and i encouraged certain action to be taken to put pressure on the taliban as well as bin laden. >> i take it that your answer to my question is that you did advise in favor o